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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1995, Minnesota created a blended sentencing option for serious,
violent juvenile offenders. Under this new option, Extended Juvenile
1
Jurisdiction (“EJJ”), the juvenile court retains jurisdiction over the
2
offender until age 21. In EJJ cases the court also imposes an adult
sentence, which is stayed on the condition that the offender complies
3
with the conditions of probation.
Since the passage of the EJJ statute, the Minnesota Supreme Court
4
has issued a limited number of opinions reviewing EJJ cases. State v.
5
B.Y., issued April 24, 2003, involves an issue of first impression. The
B.Y. opinion addresses standards to be applied in EJJ probation
revocation proceedings, holding that adult revocation standards apply to
6
EJJ proceedings.
7
This case note provides a historical background of the EJJ statute
8
and probation revocation process in order to provide context for analysis
of the B.Y. decision. A brief description of the facts and the court’s
analysis presents further background information for the court’s
9
decision. The note goes on to discuss and explain the court’s decision
10
in light of applicable statutes and case law.
This case note seeks to address the two central questions that arise
from the B.Y. decision: first, whether the application of adult revocation
1. Juveniles falling under EJJ are referred to as Extended Jurisdiction Juveniles.
2. MINN. R. JUV. P. 19.01, subd. 1.
3. MINN. STAT. § 260B.130, subd. 4 (2002).
4. See In re Welfare of M.P.Y., 630 N.W.2d 411, 417-19 (Minn. 2001) (ruling that
an EJJ criminal defendant cannot be precluded from testifying on his own behalf); In re
Welfare of D.M.D., 607 N.W.2d 432, 436 (Minn. 2000) (confirming to the role of the
public safety factors when the prosecution designates a juvenile EJJ); In re Welfare of
G.M., 560 N.W.2d 687, 690-96 (Minn. 1997) (addressing the validity of criminal
procedure measures used in an EJJ case).
5. 659 N.W.2d 763 (Minn. 2003).
6. Id. at 768-69.
7. See infra Part II.A.
8. See infra Part II.B.
9. See infra Part III.A-B.
10. See infra Part IV.
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standards to EJJ revocation proceedings is justified under the EJJ statute
and other principles of law; and second, whether the Minnesota Supreme
Court applied the analysis used in adult proceedings to the B.Y. case in a
way that provides future guidance to lower courts.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. The Beginning of EJJ
From 1992 to 1996, forty-seven states and the District of Columbia
11
made substantive revisions to laws concerning juvenile crime. These
revisions reflected a shift in the focus of juvenile courts from the
12
rehabilitation of juvenile offenders to public safety and accountability.
This shift was, in part, due to an increase in serious, violent offenses
13
committed by juveniles.
In Minnesota, the catalyst for change to the juvenile system came in
1991 when juveniles represented 43% of the total number of arrests
14
made for serious crimes. The 1992 Legislature addressed this problem
by creating the Minnesota Task Force on the Juvenile Justice System
15
(“Task Force”). The Task Force examined the process of transferring
11. See PATRICIA TORBET ET AL., U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
TO SERIOUS AND VIOLENT JUVENILE CRIME 59 (1996).

STATE RESPONSES

12. Barry C. Feld, Violent Youth and Public Policy: A Case Study of Juvenile
Justice Law Reform, 79 MINN. L. REV. 965, 1071 (1995) (identifying trend toward public
safety, punishment, and individual accountability within juvenile code legislative purpose
clauses); see also Andrew Walkover, The Infancy Defense in the New Juvenile Court, 31
UCLA L. REV. 503, 523-24 (1984) (naming accountability and punishment as emerging
purposes of juvenile justice statues and recognizing a heavier consideration of culpability
and accountability in waiver and dispositional decisions); see also TORBET, supra note
11, at 59 (providing a brief discussion of the changing purpose of the juvenile justice
system); Kathryn A. Santelmann & Kari L. Lillesand, Extended Jurisdiction Juveniles in
Minnesota: A Prosecutor’s Perspective, 25 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1303, 1304
(explaining that Minnesota’s juvenile statute reforms shifted the focus of the juvenile
courts from rehabilitation to public safety).
13. See TORBET, supra note 11, at 59 (suggesting that changes made in juvenile
justice systems came about as a legal response to juvenile crime).
14. See DANIEL STORKAMP, MINNESOTA CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
CENTER, MINNESOTA PLANNING: OVERVIEW OF JUVENILE CRIME IN MINNESOTA 5 (Feb. 26,
1993); Santelmann & Lillesand, supra note 12, at 1305 (highlighting this statistic as one
that caused the Legislature to act on juvenile matters).
15. See Act of Apr. 29, 1992, ch. 571, art. 7, § 13, 1992 Minn. Laws 1983, 2048.
The Task Force was assigned to study the juvenile justice system and make
recommendations regarding:
(1) the juvenile certification process;
(2) the retention of juvenile delinquency adjudication records and their use in

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2003

3

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 2 [2003], Art. 3
3 SANTELMANN - PAGINATED.DOC

430

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

12/8/2003 2:50 PM

[Vol. 30:2

juveniles to adult court for prosecution and the disposition options
16
In their report, the Task Force
available in juvenile court.
recommended to the Legislature significant revisions to the transfer
process and the establishment of a juvenile blended-sentencing option,
consisting of a juvenile court disposition and imposition of a stayed adult
17
sentence. The Legislature adopted the Task Force’s recommendation,
codified this blended sentencing option as “Extended Juvenile
18
Jurisdiction,” and codified it at Minnesota Statutes section 260B.130.
The creation of EJJ gives juvenile courts the ability to impose upon a
juvenile offender one or more juvenile dispositions and an adult criminal
sentence, which is stayed on the condition that the juvenile does not
violate the disposition order or commit a new offense.19
In addition to creating the blended sentencing option of EJJ, this
new legislation significantly altered the way in which juvenile cases
20
could be transferred, or “certified,” to adult court.
Before the Task
Force recommendations were enacted in 1995, the transfer of juvenile
cases to adult court was a possibility for any juvenile ages 14 to 17 who
21
22
had committed any crime. Following the Task Force’s suggestions,
subsequent adult proceedings;
(3) the feasibility of a system of statewide juvenile guidelines;
(4) the effectiveness of various juvenile justice system approaches, including
behavior modification and treatment; and
(5) the extension to juveniles of a nonwaivable right to counsel and a right to
a jury trial.
Id. at subd. 4(1)-(5).
16. See ADVISORY TASK FORCE ON THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM, MINNESOTA
SUPREME COURT, FINAL REPORT 31-37 (Jan. 1994) [hereinafter TASK FORCE, FINAL
REPORT]. The Task Force’s recommendations contemplated the needs of the juvenile
offender and the need to control the juvenile for the benefit of the juvenile and protection
of society. Id. at 3.
17. See id. (providing a thorough discussion of how these recommendations were
reached).
18. See also Santelmann & Lillesand, supra note 12, at 1306, 1306 n.21 (explaining
blended sentencing as involving a juvenile and adult sentence); TORBET, supra note 11, at
11-14 (providing a detailed explanation of the five models of blended sentencing that
have emerged).
19. MINN. STAT. § 260B.130, subd. 4(a).
20. MINN. STAT. § 260.125 (1992) (current version at § 260B.125 (2002))
(reflecting the certification process before the implementation of the EJJ designation).
21. MINN. STAT. § 260.125. Before 1995, the transfer process, called “reference,”
was not limited to the severity of the offense. § 260.125. The 1992 statute authorized the
reference of a juvenile to adult court upon the finding of probable cause to believe the
juvenile committed the offense and a showing, by clear and convincing evidence, that the
child was not suitable for treatment in the juvenile system or that public safety was not
served by retaining the case in juvenile court. § 260.125, subd. 2(d)(1),(2). The statute
further included specifications for establishing a prima facie case for transferring to adult
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the legislature revised the transfer statute by limiting certification to
23
felony offenses and designating public safety as the primary concern.
A significant aspect of this revision was the creation of presumptive and
24
non-presumptive certification processes.
Under the statute,
certification is presumed for juveniles ages 16 or 17 who commit a
felony offense for which the Sentencing Guidelines presume a
25
26
commitment to prison or that involve a firearm.
In presumptive
certification cases, the juvenile bears the burden of proving, by clear and
convincing evidence, that retaining the proceedings in juvenile court as
27
an EJJ case serves public safety.
Non-presumptive certification cases include all felonies committed
by 14- and 15-year-olds, and offenses committed by 16- or 17-year-olds
that do not call for a presumptive prison sentence under the Guidelines or
28
do not involve the use of a firearm. In non-presumptive cases, the state
bears the burden of proving, by clear and convincing evidence, that
29
retaining the proceeding in juvenile court does not serve public safety.
While seeking to ensure a more consistent approach for certifying
30
the most serious juvenile offenders to be prosecuted as adults, the Task
Force also sought to give juveniles “one last chance at success in the
court 16-year-olds and 17-year-olds who had committed serious offenses. § 260.125,
subd. 3. Within the prima facie case, the burden of proof was on the prosecution. See
Santelmann & Lillesand, supra note 12, at 1306. Prior to 1994, the Juvenile Court Rules
set forth eleven factors for courts to consider in making the transfer decision. See MINN.
R. JUV. P. 32.05, subd. 2 (repealed 1996); see also TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT, supra
note 16, at 22-23 (detailing the criteria for certification in 1983).
22. See TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT, supra note 16, at 27.
23. See Act of May 5, 1994, ch. 576, § 13, 1994 Minn. Laws 934, 940-945
(showing a record of the amendments made to MINN. STAT. § 260.125); Act of May 5,
1994, ch. 576, § 68, 1994 Minn. Laws 934, 985 (referencing the effective date of ch. 576,
§ 13, 1994 Minn. Laws 934, 940-945 as January 1, 1995).
24. See Santelmann & Lillesand, supra note 12, at 1308 (explaining this distinction
as a significant amendment to the transfer procedure).
25. MINN. STAT. § 260B.125, subd. 3(2) (2002) (specifying that a presumptive
commitment to prison can result from the sentencing guidelines or an applicable statute).
26. MINN. STAT. § 260B.125, subd. 3 (articulating the criteria for the presumption of
certification).
27. Id.
28. MINN. STAT. § 260B.125, subd. 1 (allowing but not requiring certification of
felony offenders older than 14); § 260B.125, subd. 3 (failing to include 16- and 17-yearolds as requiring presumptive certification when their committed offense does not
presume a prison sentence or involve the use of a firearm).
29. MINN. STAT. § 260B.125, subd. 2(6)(ii).
30. See TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT, supra note 16, at 27 (recommending
implementation of a system that would make it easier to certify the most serious juvenile
offenders).
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juvenile system, with the threat of adult sanctions as an incentive not to
31
reoffend.” The Task Force established this “one last chance” as EJJ, to
give deserving juveniles an opportunity to change through treatment in
32
the juvenile system while still providing public safety protections by
33
The legislature responded to the
imposing a stayed adult sentence.
34
Task Force’s recommendations by statutorily creating EJJ.
EJJ designations are reserved for juvenile felony offenders ages 14
35
to 17. There are three ways in which an offender may be designated an
36
EJJ: automatic, presumptive, and designated.
Automatic EJJ
prosecution applies to juveniles 16 or older who commit a felony offense
using a firearm or for which the Sentencing Guidelines presume a
37
commitment to prison. In these cases, a prosecutor has the authority to
38
designate the case as an EJJ prosecution. Presumptive EJJ designation
occurs when, following a presumptive certification hearing, the trial
court denies the prosecutor’s motion for certification. In such cases, the
39
trial court is required to designate the case as an EJJ prosecution. The
final path to EJJ designation is through a successful motion to designate
40
the case an EJJ prosecution.
Prior to designating the proceedings as
EJJ under either of the last two paths, the court must weigh six public
41
safety factors. These six factors focus on the juvenile’s prior history,
31. TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT, supra note 16, at 33; see Santelmann & Lillesand,
supra note 12, at 1309.
32. TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT, supra note 16, at 31 (providing the rationale for
the creation of blended sentencing).
33. TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT, supra note 16, at 33.
34. See MINN. STAT. § 260.126 (1994 and Supp. 1995) (current version at MINN.
STAT. § 260B.130 (2002)) (codifying the EJJ designation as an option for juvenile
offenders).
35. MINN. STAT. § 260B.130, subd. 1 (listing the various routes for juvenile
offenders to be designated as an EJJ).
36. See In re Welfare of D.M.D., Jr., 607 N.W.2d 432, 434 (Minn. 2000) (citing
relevant statutory sections).
37. MINN. STAT. § 260B.130, subd. 1(2).
38. Id.; MINN. R. JUV. P. 19.01, subd. 3(B).
39. MINN. STAT. § 260B.125, subd. 8.
40. Id.; MINN. R. JUV. P. 18.06, subd. 1(B)(1).
41. MINN. R. JUV. P. 19.05. The six factors determining if public safety would be
served through an EJJ designation are:
(A) the seriousness of the alleged offense in terms of community protection,
including the existence of any aggravating factors recognized by the
Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines, the use of a firearm, or the impact on the
victim;
(B) the culpability of the child in committing the alleged offense, including
the level of the child’s participation in planning and carrying out the offense
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current offense, and amenability to treatment in the juvenile system.
B. Minnesota’s Approach to Revoking Probation

An essential element to the EJJ designation is the imposition of a
43
stayed adult prison sentence as a deterrent to reoffending. If a juvenile
designated EJJ violates the conditions of his or her stayed sentence or
commits a new offense, probation revocation proceedings may be
44
commenced.
The juvenile is entitled to notice and a hearing of any
45
If, following the hearing, the court finds
revocation proceeding.
reasons exist to revoke the stay of execution of sentence, the court may
then treat the juvenile offender as an adult and order any of the adult
46
sanctions authorized. However, if the EJJ offender was convicted of an
offense that presumed a commitment to prison or was convicted of any
offense that involved a firearm, and if the court finds that reasons exist to
revoke the stay, Minnesota’s statute provides that the court must execute
the formerly imposed sentence unless the court also finds mitigating
47
factors.
The Minnesota Rules of Juvenile Procedure provide further
48
guidance in the process of EJJ revocation. These rules equip the court

and the existence of any mitigating factors recognized by the Minnesota
Sentencing Guidelines;
(C) the child’s prior record of delinquency;
(D) the child’s programming history, including the child’s past willingness to
participate meaningfully in available programming;
(E) the adequacy of the punishment or programming available in the juvenile
justice system;
(F) the dispositional options available for the child.
MINN. R. JUV. P. 19.05.
42. See TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT, supra note 16, at 31 (citing Charles E.
Springer, Rehabilitating the Juvenile Court, 5 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y
397, 417 (1991)).
43. See TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT, supra note 16, at 33 (recognizing the Task
Force’s intent to adopt the blended sentencing option as an incentive for the juvenile to
be rehabilitated).
44. MINN. STAT. § 260B.130, subd. 5.
45. Id. (allowing the juvenile a chance to challenge the claimed violation(s)).
46. Id.
47. Id. Without the presence of mitigating factors that could justify continuing the
stay, the court has no discretion in implementing the stayed adult sentence when the
offense presumed a commitment to prison or involved a firearm. Id.
48. MINN. R. JUV. P. 19.09 (articulating the procedural rules for EJJ proceedings
and prosecution).
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with discretionary authority to execute the stayed sentence of an EJJ
offender if the court finds upon clear and convincing evidence that the
probationer violated any provision of the disposition order or if the
49
probationer admitted to a violation of the disposition order.
The
discretionary authority of the court becomes compulsory when the court
finds the probationer violated a provision of the disposition order or
admitted to a violation of the disposition order when the initial EJJ
conviction involved an offense holding a presumptive prison sentence or
50
an offense involving a firearm. The only exception to this compulsory
execution is if the court makes written findings noting the mitigating
51
Both the EJJ statute and
factors that validate continuing the stay.
juvenile procedural rule governing EJJ are silent as to what constitutes
“mitigating factors.”
The United States Supreme Court established standards governing
52
the process of revocation for parolees in Morrissey v. Brewer.
The
Supreme Court recognized that the effectiveness of parole stems from the
court’s ability to return the parolee to prison for failing to adhere to the
53
conditions of parole. A parole officer holds broad discretion in seeking
54
55
to have parole revoked. One year later, in Gagnon v. Scarpelli, the
Supreme Court extended the Morrissey decision to apply equally to
56
probationers. The Scarpelli Court reinforced the broad discretion of a
probation officer in holding the authority to recommend or even declare
57
revocation of probation.
State v. Austin established the criteria that Minnesota trial courts
58
must use in adult probation violation proceedings.
In determining
49. Id. at subd. 3(C)(1).
50. Id. at subd. 3(C)(2).
51. Id.
52. 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972) (holding that parolees are entitled to due process
when facing revocation of their parole and a return to prison). Parole is supervision that
follows an offender’s release from prison. See id. at 474-75.
53. See id. at 478-79.
54. See id. at 479 (noting that broad discretion is also inherent in the role of a parole
officer simply by the vague conditions of parole). “[A] parole officer ordinarily does not
take steps to have parole revoked unless he thinks that the violations are serious and
continuing so as to indicate that the parolee is not adjusting properly and cannot be
counted on to avoid antisocial activity.” Id.
55. 411 U.S. 778, 782 (1973) (affirming Morrissey in allowing due process for
probationers).
56. Id.
57. Id. at 784 (citing the responsibility to supervise the probationer’s progress in
rehabilitation as the reason for a parole officer’s broad discretion).
58. 295 N.W.2d 246, 250 (Minn. 1980) (establishing these criteria for the further
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whether an adult probationer’s previously stayed sentence should be
executed, Austin requires the court to:
(1) designate the specific condition or conditions that were
violated;
(2) find that the violation was intentional or inexcusable; and
(3) find that need for confinement outweighs the policies
59
favoring probation.
Since the court’s decision in Austin in 1980, the three factors articulated
in the decision have become the cornerstone of any trial court’s decision
60
to revoke adult probation. However, until B.Y. the Austin factors had
not been applied to EJJ probation revocation proceedings.
With the creation of EJJ in 1995, Minnesota appellate courts
developed the standard to be used in EJJ probation revocation
61
proceedings.
Distinguishing EJJ from adult probation violation
proceedings, the Minnesota Court of Appeals held in State v. Bradley
that only the first two Austin factors applied to EJJ revocation
proceedings; the Bradley court noted that the third factor, weighing the
need for confinement against policies favoring probation, is not
62
consistent with the EJJ statute. The J.K. court followed precedent and
63
evaluated EJJ revocation based upon only the first two Austin factors.
In addition to these two key appellate decisions, a number of unpublished
appellate decisions have reviewed lower-court decisions revoking EJJ
64
status. A number of these unpublished decisions follow the standard
guidance of lower courts in determining probation revocation).
59. Id. (listing these factors as a mandatory evaluation by the court before adult
probation may be revoked).
60. See State v. Hamilton, 646 N.W.2d 915, 917 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002) (applying
the Austin factors in revoking adult probation); State v. Theel, 532 N.W.2d 265, 267
(Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (recognizing the requirement of a court to engage in the Austin
analysis while considering the revocation of adult probation).
61. See In re J.K., 641 N.W.2d 617 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002); State v. Bradley, 592
N.W.2d 886 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999).
62. See Bradley, 592 N.W.2d at 887 (declining to evaluate the facts in light of the
third Austin factor and recognizing more discretion in revoking EJJ probation relative to
revoking adult probation).
63. See In re J.K., 641 N.W.2d at 621 (citing Bradley as authority in applying two
of the three Austin factors).
64. See State v. Henson, No. C2-02-297, 2002 WL 1424430 at *5 (Minn. Ct. App.
July 2, 2002) (holding that probationer gave up his “one last chance” to be successful in
the juvenile system by failing to obey his probation officer); State v. Washington, No.
C0-02-914, 2002 WL 31553980 at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Nov. 19, 2002) (revoking EJJ
probation for probationer’s failure to maintain contact with his probation officer over a
four-month period of time); State v. Yang, C9-02-605, 2002 WL 1614065 at *2 (Minn.
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65

III. STATE V. B.Y.
A. The Facts
On February 9, 1998, B.Y., based upon a plea agreement, pled
66
guilty to kidnapping and committing a crime for the benefit of a gang.
B.Y.’s plea resulted from his participation in the kidnapping and gang
67
At the time of the offense, B.Y. was 15
rape of a 12 year-old girl.
years old and the prosecution had moved to certify him to stand trial as
68
an adult. Because of B.Y.’s age at the time of the offense, certification
69
to adult court was not presumptive.
In addition to his guilty plea to charges of kidnapping and
committing a crime for the benefit of a gang, B.Y. agreed to designation
Ct. App. July 23, 2002) (listing numerous probation violations as reason to revoke EJJ
probation); In re Welfare of J.C.B., No. C2-00-649, 2000 WL 1778910 at *2 (Minn. Ct.
App. Nov. 21, 2000) (finding EJJ revocation proper under the EJJ statute and the
applicable Rule of Juvenile Procedure for a “technical” probation violation); State v.
McArthur, No. C4-99-502, 1999 WL 759985 at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 28, 1999)
(executing a stayed sentence because probationer possessed a firearm in violation of his
terms of probation); Welfare of C.A.S., No. C8-98-217, 1998 WL 345514 at *1 (Minn.
Ct. App. June 30, 1998) (upholding probationer’s EJJ status due to probationer’s decision
to reoffend).
65. See Henson, 2002 WL 1424430 at *3 (citing Austin as authority to revoke
probation if a probation officer’s instructions are disobeyed); Yang, 2002 WL 1614065 at
*1 (upholding the application of the first two Austin factors in revoking probation under
the EJJ statute); In re Welfare of J.C.B., 2000 WL 1778910 at *2 (stating that the text of
the EJJ statute does not require the district court to consider the third Austin factor);
Welfare of C.A.S., 1998 WL 345514 at *2 (defining Austin as applying solely to adults
violating probation). But see Washington, 2002 WL 31553980 at *1 (failing to discuss
Austin in its brief opinion); McArthur, 1999 WL 759985 at *1 (mentioning Austin only to
provide the applicable standard of review).
66. State v. B.Y., 659 N.W.2d 763, 765 (Minn. 2003) (explaining that B.Y.’s
agreement to plead guilty to kidnapping and committing a crime to benefit a criminal
gang was only one of the conditions of the plea bargain). B.Y. was initially charged with
first-degree criminal sexual conduct, conspiracy to commit criminal sexual conduct,
kidnapping, and crime committed for the benefit of a gang. Appellant’s Brief and App. at
5, B.Y. (No. C7-01-897); Respondent’s Brief at 2, B.Y. (No. C7-01-897) (citing Plea Tr.,
Feb. 9, 1998, page 3). The original Plea Transcript from February 9, 1998 is not
accessible to the public because of B.Y.’s juvenile status at the time of the offense.
67. B.Y., 659 N.W.2d at 765 (identifying the offense of the crime for the benefit of a
criminal gang as gang rape).
68. Id.; see also Respondent’s Brief, supra note 66, at 2 (citing Plea Tr., Feb. 9,
1998, p. 3).
69. MINN. STAT. § 260B.125, subd. 3 (2002).
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70

as an EJJ until the age of 21, and imposition of a 108-month adult
71
prison sentence. Based on the EJJ designation, the adult sentence was
stayed. Further terms of B.Y.’s plea included his agreement to testify
truthfully at the trials of other individuals involved in the offense,
completion of a juvenile rehabilitation program, discontinued association
72
with known gang members, and no contact with the victim.
The district court informed B.Y. at the sentencing hearing on
February 9, 1998 that violations of the terms and conditions of probation
73
would trigger the execution of the 108-month prison sentence. More
than a year later, the court allowed B.Y. to return home after successfully
74
completing the juvenile rehabilitation program at Woodland Hills. At a
hearing in June of 1999, the court again reminded B.Y. that a probation
violation before he turned 21 would result in the execution of the 10875
month prison sentence.
On February 9, 2001, B.Y. appeared before a juvenile court judge
on allegations that he had violated the terms of his EJJ probation by
76
failing to abide by the curfew set by his probation officer.
The
probable cause statement, attached to the probation violation warrant,
77
also set forth other alleged violations of probation.
At that hearing,
70. B.Y., 659 N.W.2d at 765. The court has authority over an EJJ who enters a
guilty plea to impose one or more juvenile dispositions and an adult criminal sentence
stayed upon the proposition that the juvenile does not violate the provisions in the
disposition order or commit a new offense. MINN. STAT. § 260B.130, subd. 4(a) (2002).
71. B.Y., 659 N.W.2d at 765. This sentence was set forth in the plea agreement. Id.
The agreement calculated the applicable sentences for kidnapping and crime for the
benefit of a criminal gang. Id. The kidnapping charge held a presumptive prison
sentence of forty-eight months. Id. This sentence was determined by assigning the
severity level of 7 to the offense of Kidnapping-Victim Under 16 and examining the
severity level under the Sentencing Guidelines Grid. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUAL, NUMERICAL REFERENCE OF FELONY STATUTES, SENTENCING GUIDELINES GRID §
IV (1997). The plea included a double durational departure from the sentencing
guidelines recommendation for kidnapping, equaling a ninety-six-month prison term.
B.Y., 659 N.W.2d at 765. The crime for the benefit of a criminal gang charge added a
presumptive sentence of twelve months consecutive to the ninety-six months already
determined by the kidnapping offense, resulting in a total stayed sentence of 108 months.
Id.
72. B.Y., 659 N.W.2d at 765.
73. Id. Aside from the plea agreement, no additional conditions were discussed at
the hearing or placed in the disposition order. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. (quoting the court as saying “don’t commit any new crimes and keep in
touch”).
76. Id. at 766.
77. Appellant’s Brief and App., supra note 67, Motion for Rehearing and Motion to
Reconsider, at Appellant’s App. 1-1. The “Probable Cause Statement attached to the
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78

B.Y. admitted he violated his 9:00 p.m. curfew.
The district court
judge and court of appeals determined this admission constituted a
79
probation violation.
The trial court ordered a study to determine
whether B.Y.’s EJJ designation should be revoked and the stayed adult
80
At a subsequent disposition hearing, the state
sentence executed.
81
presented evidence of other violations.
A probation officer testified
that B.Y. had previously been placed on “enhanced probation” with a
stricter level of supervision because of B.Y.’s inability to check in
82
weekly with his probation officer.
The State contended that B.Y.
previously was placed at the Juvenile Detention Center for a curfew
83
violation, failed to show up for eight hours of work crew for a separate
curfew violation, refused to make up for the eight hours of missed work
84
crew, and was placed at the Adult Detention Center for curfew and
85
school attendance violations.
Following the report of the probation officer, and arguments of
counsel, the court revoked B.Y.’s EJJ status and executed his 108-month
86
sentence. The district court found that there were no mitigating factors
87
to justify continuing the stay of execution of the adult sentence. Based
[Probation Violation Warrant] listed numerous curfew violations from 11-30-00 to 2-601.” Id. The original Probable Cause Statement and Probation Violation Warrant are not
accessible to the public due to B.Y.’s juvenile status at the time of the offense.
78. B.Y., 659 N.W.2d at 766.
79. Id.; see also State v. Yang, No. C7-01-897, 2002 WL 523433 at *3 (Minn. Ct.
App. Apr. 9, 2002) (concluding that even a “technical” violation is still a violation). The
court of appeals opinion also discusses the district court’s findings of B.Y.’s probationary
history as involving repeated failures to comply with conditions laid out by his probation
officer and numerous warnings that violating these conditions would result in probation
revocation. Id.
80. See Respondent’s Brief, supra note 66, at 4 (citing Tr. of Hearing Feb. 9, 2001,
p. 6). The original Transcript of Hearing from February 9, 2001 is not accessible to the
public because of B.Y.’s juvenile status at the time of the offense.
81. B.Y., 659 N.W.2d at 766. The State argued that it would not seek revocation of
probation “for a mere curfew violation had there not been multiple violations and had
[B.Y.] not shown that he was unamenable to supervision.” Id.
82. Id. The transfer to “enhanced probation” resulted from a one- to two-month
period where B.Y. did not properly report to his probation officer and concerns were
raised that B.Y. was not attending school or residing at his parents’ house full time. Id.
83. Id. (asserting that B.Y. was placed on twenty-four-hour hold at the Juvenile
Detention Center).
84. Id. B.Y. was given two eight-hour days on a work crew for a violation; B.Y.
failed to show up on the second day.
85. Id. (asserting that B.Y. was placed on forty-eight-hour hold at the Adult
Detention Center).
86. Id.
87. State v. Yang, No. C7-01-897, 2002 WL 523433 at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 9,
2002) (referencing the district court’s failure to find any mitigating factors).
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upon this finding, the court was compelled to execute B.Y.’s stayed
88
After hearing B.Y.’s appeal, the court of appeals affirmed
sentence.
89
the district court’s decision.
B. The Minnesota Supreme Court’s Analysis
In reviewing the district court and court of appeals opinions, the
Minnesota Supreme Court examined the provisions of the EJJ statute
governing probation violations. The court concluded that the statutory
provision requiring execution of the stayed adult sentence when the
original offense assumes a presumptive prison sentence applies to all EJJ
90
This portion of the opinion holds that
offenders, regardless of age.
presumptive execution of an adult sentence is not limited to 16- and 1791
In so holding, the court found that the Rules of Juvenile
year-olds.
Procedure and the statute do not conflict as they relate to the standards
92
for execution of an adult sentence.
Next, the court examined whether the Austin factors are applicable
93
to EJJ probation revocation proceedings. The court concluded that all
three of the Austin factors must be considered to determine if “reasons
94
exist to revoke the stayed sentence.” The court reasoned that the need
to balance a probationer’s interest in freedom with the State’s interest in
ensuring rehabilitation and public safety, as required under Austin, is also
88. Id.
89. Id. (concluding that execution of B.Y.’s stayed sentence is required under
MINN. STAT. § 260B.130, subd. 5 absent any mitigating factors). The court of appeals
noted that B.Y’s probation history included repeated failures to abide by conditions of his
probation and repeated warnings by the court and probation officer that violations would
trigger revocation of his probation. Id. at *3.
90. See B.Y., 659 N.W.2d at 768 (determining this to be true once the violation has
been established); MINN. STAT. § 260B.130, subd. 5 (differentiating between the
circumstances when adult sentences shall or must be executed).
91. See B.Y., 659 N.W.2d at 768 (agreeing with the prosecution that B.Y.’s age at
the time of the offense was not a factor in the revocation proceedings).
92. See id. (identifying the consistency between the statute and rule to recognize the
offense rather than age as the key factor in determining the mandatory or discretionary
execution of adult sentence). Compare MINN. STAT. § 260B.130, subd. 5 (recognizing
the EJJ conviction due to an offense with a presumptive prison sentence as a crucial
component in the court’s requirement to order execution of an adult sentence) with MINN.
R. JUV. P. 19.09, subd. 3(C)(2) (failing to address age while stating requirements for the
court to order execution of an adult sentence).
93. B.Y., 659 N.W.2d at 768 (noting that the Minnesota Supreme Court had not yet
addressed Austin in light of EJJ probation revocation).
94. Id. (distinguishing this requirement as an addition to the requirement that the
EJJ conviction be based upon an offense that presumed a prison sentence or involved a
firearm).
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present in EJJ revocation proceedings because “revocation of EJJ
95
probation may result in the execution of an adult sentence.” The court
went on to note that Rule 19.09, subdivision 3(C)(2) of the Minnesota
Rules of Juvenile Procedure contains neither the statute’s “reasons to
96
reduce the stay” language, nor the Austin analysis. Based upon these
deficits, the court directed the Supreme Court Advisory Committee on
the Rules of Juvenile Procedure to review Rule 19.09, subdivision 3(C)
97
for appropriate amendments incorporating the Austin factors.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE B.Y. DECISION
Since the passage of Minnesota’s EJJ statute, the Minnesota
Supreme Court has issued a limited number of opinions addressing
98
substantive issues related to EJJ. Prior to B.Y., none of these decisions
had addressed the issue of revocation of EJJ status. In B.Y., the court
addressed revocation for the first time and held that the standards of
probation revocation established in Austin apply to EJJ revocation
99
proceedings. As discussed above, in so holding, the court overruled the
100
court of appeals decisions in J.K. and Bradley.
Prior to B.Y., an EJJ offender was in a unique category—neither
juvenile nor adult offender but a blend of both. Previously, the adult
standards for probation revocation were not applied based upon a literal
101
reading of the governing statutory provisions.
B.Y. has changed this.
Now, in terms of probation violation proceedings, the analysis used in

95. Id. at 769.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 769 n.3.
98. See, e.g., In re Welfare of D.M.D., Jr., 607 N.W.2d 432 (Minn. 2000) (holding
that nonoffense related evidence of a juvenile’s dangerousness is not a requirement for
the prosecution to designate a juvenile offender as an EJJ under the public safety
requirements). The Minnesota Supreme Court has issued other decisions addressing EJJ
procedural concerns. See supra note 4.
99. See B.Y., 659 N.W.2d at 768-69 (stating that all three Austin factors must be met
to revoke probation).
100. Id.; see also In re Welfare of J.K., 641 N.W.2d 617, 621 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002)
(recognizing that the EJJ text does not require consideration of the third Austin factor);
State v. Bradley, 592 N.W.2d 886, 887-88 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999) (concluding that the
third Austin factor is not easily reconciled with the EJJ statute).
101. The Bradley court held that the third Austin factor, weighing confinement
against probation policy, conflicted with the EJJ statute requirement of revoking
probation for a violation absent any mitigating factors. 592 N.W.2d at 887. The J.K.
court reinforced Bradley’s holding that it is not necessary under the EJJ statute to
consider the third Austin factor. 641 N.W.2d at 621.
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102

A. The Age of the Offender in EJJ Probation Violation Proceedings
The first issue addressed by the B.Y. court clarified the distinction
between violations of probation that require the trial court to execute the
103
The provision governing
stayed adult sentence and those that do not.
probation violation proceedings, section 260B.130, subdivision 5 of the
Minnesota Statutes, provides in pertinent part that:
If the offender was convicted of an offense described in
subdivision 1, clause (2), and the court finds that reasons exist
to revoke the stay, the court must order execution of the
previously imposed sentence unless the court makes written
findings regarding the mitigating factors that justify continuing
104
the stay.
Subdivision 1, clause (2) of the same statute describes both the offender
and the offense for which EJJ designation is mandatory upon designation
105
by the prosecutor.
This provision applies to any 16- or 17-year-old
offender alleged to have committed a felony if the offense is one for
which the Sentencing Guidelines and applicable statutes presume a
commitment to prison or in which the offender allegedly used a
106
firearm.
The sole issue raised by the appellant involved the application of the
language of section 260B.130, subdivision 5, to offenders younger than
107
16.
The appellant argued that, because the language of subdivision 1,
clause (2) refers to both the age of the offender and the offense, the
language of subdivision 5, requiring the execution of the adult sentence
absent mitigating circumstances, does not apply to any EJJ offender
108
younger than 16 at the time of the offense.
Appellant further argued
that, based upon this interpretation, subdivision 3(C)(2) of Minnesota
109
Rule of Juvenile Procedure 19.09 is inconsistent with the statute.
102. By ruling that the third Austin factor applies to EJJ revocation proceedings, B.Y.
changed the standards for EJJ probation violators to equal the standards of adult
probation violators. See B.Y., 659 N.W.2d at 768.
103. See id. at 767.
104. MINN. STAT. § 260B.130, subd. 5 (2002).
105. Id. at subd. 1(2) (2002).
106. Id.
107. B.Y., 659 N.W.2d at 767.
108. See id.
109. B.Y., 659 N.W.2d at 767. The Minnesota Rules of Juvenile Procedure do not
refer to an offender’s age, only the offense, when articulating under what circumstances a
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The State argued that the appellant’s position required an implied
amendment to the revocation statute, changing the pertinent language of
section 260B.130, subdivision 5 from “if the offender was convicted of
an offense described in subdivision 1, clause (2)” to “if the offender was
110
designated EJJ pursuant to subdivision 1, clause (2).”
111
The court summarily rejected the appellant’s argument.
In a
well-reasoned analysis, the court interpreted the statute according to its
112
The court noted that subdivision 5 of section
plain meaning.
260B.130 refers to “an offense described in subdivision 1, clause (2)”
113
and does not “mention the age of the offender.”
Based upon this plain
language, the court held that subdivision 5, section 260B.130 “is
properly read to require the execution of the adult sentence, absent
written mitigating factors, regardless of the age of the defendant at the
114
time of the original offense.”
Thus, the court reasonably concluded
that the statute and rule do not conflict. The court’s reasoning is also
consistent with the Sentencing Guidelines, which do not distinguish
between a presumptive stay or executed sentence based upon the age of
115
the offender.
B. Application of Austin to EJJ Probation Revocation Proceedings
The central issue addressed by the court in B.Y. was not one
116
After clarifying that the age of the
specifically raised by the appellant.
offender is immaterial to the revocation decision, the court went on to
discuss the application of Austin to EJJ probation violation
117
proceedings.
It is this application of the Austin analysis to EJJ
proceedings that is the focus of this case note.
As set forth above, Austin established a three-step analysis for
courts to use in determining whether reasons exist to revoke an adult

trial court is required to order execution of the adult sentence. MINN. R. JUV. P. 19.09,
subd. 3(C)(2).
110. Respondent’s Brief and App., supra note 66, at 30.
111. B.Y., 659 N.W.2d at 767-68.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 768.
115. MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMMISSION, MINNESOTA SENTENCING
GUIDELINES AND COMMENTARY 49 (2003) [hereinafter SENTENCING GUIDELINES]. The
two determinative factors in the Sentencing Guidelines Grid are the severity of the
offense committed and the offender’s criminal history score. Id.
116. B.Y., 659 N.W.2d at 768.
117. See id. at 768-69.
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118

offender’s probation.
In B.Y., the court held that all three of the Austin
119
This decision
factors apply to EJJ probation revocation proceedings.
raises two fundamental concerns. The first concern is whether applying
the three Austin factors to EJJ revocation proceedings is consistent with
120
the EJJ statute and other principles of law.
The second concern is
whether the Minnesota Supreme Court applied the Austin factors in a
121
manner that lower courts can understand and implement.
C. Application of the Austin Analysis to EJJ Probation Revocation
Proceedings
A fundamental difficulty in understanding the B.Y. decision can be
traced to the governing statute’s failure to distinguish between the two
122
In
decisions a trial court must make in EJJ revocation proceedings.
EJJ probation violation proceedings, unlike adult violation proceedings,
the trial court must first decide whether to revoke an offender’s EJJ
123
designation.
If the trial court determines revocation of the EJJ
designation is warranted, then the trial court must decide whether
124
grounds exist to execute the stayed adult sentence.
Thus, the decision
to revoke EJJ designation is a decision to transfer the case to adult court
and nothing more.
It is unclear from the holding in B.Y. whether the court intended the
Austin analysis to apply to the decision to revoke EJJ designation, or
simply to the decision to execute the adult sentence once EJJ status has
been revoked. If the decision is read to require the Austin analysis
applies to the decision to revoke an offender’s EJJ designation, then
application of the third Austin factor does not seem to fit within the
analytical structure of the statute.
118. See supra Part II.B.
119. B.Y., 659 N.W.2d at 769.
120. See infra Part IV.C.
121. See infra Part IV.D.
122. See MINN. STAT. § 260B.130, subd. 5 (2002). The imprecise language of MINN.
STAT. § 260B.130, subdivision 5 simply requires the trial court to determine whether
“reasons exist to revoke the stay of execution of sentence . . . .” Id. However, execution
of the stayed adult sentence does not automatically flow from the decision to revoke the
EJJ designation. Under the statute, the trial court’s decision to execute the adult sentence
does not arise unless the court first finds that the offender has violated his or her EJJ
probation. See id. The court must then determine, based on whether the Sentencing
Guidelines provide for a presumptive or non-presumptive prison sentence, whether
execution of the stayed sentence is warranted. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
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It appears that by the terms of the statute, the juvenile court judge
must find an intentional or inexcusable violation of a term of probation
125
before transfer of the case to adult court.
Due process requires such
126
Thus, application of the first two Austin factors to the decision
proof.
to revoke an offender’s EJJ designation is justified under both the statute
and governing principles of law. However, application of the third
Austin factor to the decision to revoke an offender’s EJJ designation is
premature.
Revocation of an offender’s EJJ designation does not automatically
result in execution of a prison sentence in either presumptive or non127
presumptive cases.
In non-presumptive cases, once the trial court has
ordered revocation of the offender’s EJJ status and transferred the case to
adult court, the court can then order any of the sanctions available to an
128
adult sentencing court.
It is unnecessary to determine that the “need
for confinement outweighs the policies favoring probation,” the third
factor under Austin, if the trial court can simply continue the offender on
adult probation. In presumptive cases, the statute requires the court to
execute the stayed adult sentence unless it finds mitigating factors to
129
justify continuing the stay.
Thus, in both non-presumptive and
presumptive cases, application of the third Austin factor is unnecessary to
the decision to transfer the case to adult court through revocation of the
EJJ designation.
The practical result is that the third Austin factor must be modified
slightly in order to logically apply it to the decision to revoke an EJJ
125. Id. The statute requires a finding that the offender violated a condition of the
stayed sentence and that reasons exist to revoke the stay of execution of sentence. Id.
126. The United States Supreme Court established the principle that parolees are
entitled to due process when facing revocation of their parole and a return to prison. See
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 499-500 (1972). One year later, this principle was
extended to probationers facing revocation. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 78182 (1973). The minimum due process to which offenders are entitled includes:
(a) written notice of the claimed violations of parole; (b) disclosure to the
parolee of evidence against him; (c) opportunity to be heard in person and to
present witnesses and documentary evidence; (d) the right to confront and
cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless the hearing officer specifically finds
good cause for not allowing confrontation); (e) a “neutral and detached”
hearing body such as a traditional parole board, members of which need not
be judicial officers or lawyers; and (f) a written statement by the factfinders
[sic] as to the evidence relied on and reasons for revoking parole.
Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 489.
127. MINN. STAT. § 260B.130, subd. 5 (2002).
128. Id.
129. Id.
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designation. At the stage where a court considers revoking an offender’s
EJJ status, the issue is whether the need to transfer the case to adult court
outweighs the desire to retain the offender in the juvenile system. With
this caveat, application of the Austin analysis can be made to fit the
decision to revoke EJJ designation.
The holding in B.Y. can also be read as applicable only to the
decision to revoke the stay of execution of sentence following revocation
of EJJ designation. This interpretation is reasonable because the court
refers to the decision to revoke the stay of execution of sentence when
applying the Austin analysis. If the opinion is interpreted in this way, the
decision is consistent with the philosophy adopted by the court in Austin
and its progeny. However, it raises serious questions about whether the
intent of the statute can be enforced. The Bradley court articulated the
130
intent of the statute.
In Bradley, the court of appeals noted that the balance between the
need for confinement and the policies favoring probation is difficult to
131
reconcile with the policies articulated in the EJJ statute.
The Bradley
court held that, in light of the “one last chance” nature of EJJ
proceedings, the trial court was not required to consider whether the need
132
for confinement outweighed the policy in favor of probation.
However, the Task Force report did not characterize EJJ as the one last
chance to avoid adult prison. The “one last chance” contemplated by the
Task Force was “success in the juvenile system, with the threat of adult
133
sanctions as an incentive not to reoffend.”
Furthermore, the statute gives trial courts the option, upon
revocation of the EJJ designation, to continue or execute the stayed adult
134
sentence.
Based upon both the Task Force report and the provisions
of the statute, it is perhaps more accurate to characterize EJJ as the “one
last chance at juvenile programming.” Thus, application of the Austin
analysis may not be as inconsistent with the intent of the statute as it first
appears. Yet, it can also be argued that to require the trial court to
consider whether the need for confinement outweighs the policies
favoring probation when deciding whether to revoke the stay of
execution of sentence ignores the second stated intent of the EJJ statute:
certainty of punishment.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

State v. Bradley, 592 N.W.2d 886 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999).
Id. at 887.
Id. at 888.
See TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT, supra note 16, at 33.
MINN. STAT. § 260B.130, subd. 5.
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Certainty of punishment upon violation of EJJ probation was a
135
This is
critical component of the statute when drafted and passed.
particularly clear in cases where the Sentencing Guidelines presume a
commitment to prison. In these cases, the trial court must execute the
136
stayed adult sentence unless it finds mitigating factors.
Application of
the third Austin factor diminishes this certainty of punishment.
Moreover, its application to an EJJ case where the statute presumes
certification to adult court appears to discount the opportunity the
offender was given to prove that the policies favoring probation
outweigh the need for confinement.
In its application of the third Austin factor, the B.Y. court does not
address the opportunity the offender has already been given to avoid
adult prison. A trial court, when it honors a plea agreement or makes an
independent determination to designate an offender as EJJ, has already
considered the question of whether the policies favoring probation
outweigh the need for confinement in an adult institution. When the
court designates the offender EJJ, it has already found that the offender
should be given the opportunity to avoid adult prison through
programming in the juvenile system. The B.Y. court does not explain
why the trial court should again be required to examine whether the need
for confinement outweighs the policies favoring probation at the time of
revocation of EJJ designation. Furthermore, requiring the court to
conduct this examination when addressing the second decision, whether
to execute the adult sentence, is consistent with the terms of the statute,
but only in non-presumptive cases. Once the decision has been made to
revoke an offender’s EJJ designation, in non-presumptive cases, the
statute gives the court all the sentencing options available in adult
proceedings. To apply the third Austin factor in non-presumptive cases
to the decision to execute the stayed sentence gives the EJJ offender the
same protections adults enjoy. This result seems fair and just. However,
in presumptive cases, the equities are not as clear.
In presumptive prison cases, unless the probation-versusconfinement analysis is interpreted to be the examination of mitigating
factors required by the EJJ statute, application of the third Austin factor

135. See TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT, supra note 16, at 34. Furthermore, upon
designation of EJJ, the trial court must impose a stayed adult sentence. The statute does
not allow for a stay of imposition of sentence. Thus, the adult sentence that the offender
may face upon revocation of the designation is established with certainty at the time of
EJJ designation.
136. MINN. STAT. § 260B.130, subd. 5.
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provides the EJJ offender more protections than afforded an adult
offender. Furthermore, unless the statute’s reference to mitigating
factors requires an analysis consistent with the Sentencing Guidelines,
EJJ offenders who commit an offense for which the Guidelines presume
a commitment to prison will be treated differently than adults who
commit the same type of offense. Because the B.Y. court did not address
application of the sentencing guidelines to EJJ revocation proceedings,
these issues remain unresolved.
D. Application of the Austin Analysis
Perhaps the most helpful aspect of the B.Y. decision for practitioners
is its articulation of the mitigating factors that justify continuing the stay
137
of execution of sentence.
However, the difficulties with the decision
include an unclear standard of review, an unclear amount of authority
probation officers should be given to monitor EJJ offenders, and an
unclear role of the reviewing court.
Minnesota has historically afforded the trial court broad discretion
138
to determine whether there are sufficient grounds to revoke probation.
Furthermore, as articulated in Austin and its progeny, a trial court’s
decision is to be reversed only when the reviewing court finds a clear
139
abuse of this discretion.
The Minnesota Court of Appeals used this
standard of review as it reviewed the trial court’s decision to revoke
137. State v. B.Y., 659 N.W.2d 763, 770-72 (Minn. 2003) (providing discussion as to
the mitigating factors in B.Y.’s situation).
138. Minnesota appellate courts have long recognized the broad discretion of a trial
court in determining whether there is sufficient evidence to revoke probation, reversing
only if the trial court clearly abused its discretion. See, e.g., State v. Hamilton, 646
N.W.2d 915, 917 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002); State v. Schwartz, 615 N.W.2d 85, 90 (Minn.
Ct. App. 2000); State v. Balma, 549 N.W.2d 102, 104 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996); State v.
Hlavac, 540 N.W.2d 551, 552 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995); State v. Theel, 532 N.W.2d 265,
266-67 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995); State v. Morrow, 492 N.W.2d 539, 543 (Minn. Ct. App.
1992); State v. Wittenberg, 441 N.W.2d 519, 521 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989); State v.
Fritsche, 402 N.W.2d 197, 201 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987); State v. Moot, 398 N.W.2d 21, 23
(Minn. Ct. App. 1987); State v. Scholberg, 393 N.W.2d 247, 248 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
139. See State v. Austin, 295 N.W.2d 246, 249-50 (Minn. 1980) (determining the
standard of review for reviewing adult probation revocation); see, e.g., State v. Hamilton,
646 N.W.2d 915, 917 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002); State v. Schwartz, 615 N.W.2d 85, 90
(Minn. Ct. App. 2000); State v. Balma, 549 N.W.2d 102, 104 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996);
State v. Hlavac, 540 N.W.2d 551, 552 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995); State v. Theel, 532 N.W.2d
265, 266-67 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995); State v. Morrow, 492 N.W.2d 539, 543 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1992); State v. Wittenberg, 441 N.W.2d 519, 521 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989) (quoting
State v. Ehmke, 400 N.W.2d 839, 840 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987)); State v. Fritsche, 402
N.W.2d 197, 201 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987); State v. Moot, 398 N.W.2d 21, 23 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1987); State v. Scholberg, 393 N.W.2d 247, 248 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
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140

B.Y.’s probation.
However, this was not the standard of review used
by the Minnesota Supreme Court.
The opinion states that the applicability of the Austin factors directly
related to the interpretation of the EJJ statute, implying a de novo
standard of review. The de novo standard is traditionally used when
141
reviewing statutory interpretations.
Thus, it is the appropriate
standard of review for the court to use when interpreting the revocation
provisions of the EJJ statute to include the Austin analysis. However, the
court did not then examine the trial court’s decision to revoke B.Y.’s EJJ
status and execute the adult sentence using an abuse of discretion
standard of review. Rather, the court found that the trial court “erred” in
142
revoking B.Y.’s EJJ probation.
The B.Y. opinion makes no mention of the broad discretion to be
afforded the trial court. Nor does it state that reversal can only be based
upon a finding that the trial court clearly abused this discretion. Thus,
while applying the same analysis used in adult revocation proceedings to
EJJ revocation proceedings, the court does not apply the same standard
of review. Consequently, the opinion calls into question the previously
well-established standard of review to be used in probation violation
proceedings.
The B.Y. decision also calls into question the authority of a
probation officer to set conditions of probation. The decision appears to
hold that the court may not find a violation of probation if the specific
condition violated has not been established by the court either in the
143
disposition order or by announcing it from the bench.
Citing to Rule 19.09, subdivision 3(C)(2) of the Minnesota Rules of
Juvenile Procedure, the court found that B.Y.’s admitted violation of
curfew could not be the basis for executing his sentence because the
144
This finding
curfew condition was not part of the disposition order.
disregards the general term of probation set by the trial court to abide by
145
the terms of probation.
The finding is also inconsistent with the long140. See State v. Yang, No. C7-01-897, 2002 WL 523433, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App.
Apr. 9, 2002).
141. See, e.g., State v. Iverson, 664 N.W.2d 346, 350 (Minn. 2003); Jorgensen v.
Knutson, 662 N.W.2d 893, 897 (Minn. 2003); BCBSM, Inc. v. Comm’r of Revenue, 663
N.W.2d 531, 532 (Minn. 2003); State v. Murphy, 545 N.W.2d 909, 914 (Minn. 1996).
142. B.Y., 659 N.W.2d at 769.
143. Using the language of Rule 19 of the Minnesota Rules of Juvenile Procedure,
the B.Y. court requires the conditions of probation to be in the disposition order. Id.
144. B.Y., 659 N.W.2d at 769.
145. See State v. Bee Yang, No. C7-01-897, 2002 WL 523433 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr.
9, 2002) (recognizing that the district court stayed B.Y.’s sentence “on the condition that
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established authority given to probation officers to set some terms of
probation.
Courts have long recognized that an order to abide by the conditions
146
of probation conveys to the probation officer significant discretion.
Ironically, the Austin decision upon which the court bases its ruling in
B.Y. involved the violation of a condition set by the probation officer.
The Austin court, in affirming the trial court’s revocation of probation,
held that there was “sufficient evidence to warrant finding that the
147
appellant intentionally disobeyed his probation officer’s instructions.”
Therefore, they found “no abuse of discretion in the decision to revoke
148
probation.”
In B.Y., the court does not appear to recognize the authority of a
probation officer to set conditions for a probationer and have those
conditions enforced by the court through violation proceedings. This
lack of recognition was apparent in the court’s refusal to consider the
curfew violation because it was not part of the disposition order, and its
discussion of mitigating factors.
Determination of mitigating factors under the EJJ probation
149
violation statute is an issue of first impression.
Therefore, the court’s
articulation of the mitigating factors presented in B.Y. is helpful.
he not violate the terms of his probation”). The court also finds that B.Y.’s admission to
the curfew violation was not an admission to the probation violation. All parties
understood that B.Y. admitted that, by violating curfew, he violated his EJJ probation.
See id. at *1; Appellant’s Brief and Appendix, supra note 66, at 6; Respondent’s Brief,
supra note 66, at 9. Thus, the Supreme Court created a factual distinction that is not
supported by the record.
146. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 478-79 (1972). In Morrissey, the Supreme
Court recognized the necessity of vague conditions of probation as consistent with the
broad discretion of a probation officer, holding that
The enforcement leverage that supports the parole conditions derives from
the authority to return the parolee to prison to serve out the balance of his
sentence if he fails to abide by the rules. In practice, not every violation of
parole conditions automatically leads to revocation. Typically, a parolee will
be counseled to abide by the conditions of parole, and the parole officer
ordinarily does not take steps to have parole revoked unless he thinks that the
violations are serious and continuing so as to indicate that the parolee is not
adjusting properly and cannot be counted on to avoid antisocial activity. The
broad discretion accorded the parole officer is also inherent in some of the
quite vague conditions, such as the typical requirement that the parolee avoid
“undesirable” associations or correspondence.
Id.; see also State v. Austin, 295 N.W.2d 246 (Minn. 1980).
147. Austin, 295 N.W.2d at 250.
148. Id.
149. B.Y., 659 N.W.2d at 769.
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However, the way in which the opinion is written results in less guidance
and, perhaps, more confusion for trial courts in EJJ revocation cases.
Without citing supporting authority, the court concludes that: “The
relevant mitigating factors are not those circumstances surrounding the
original offense, but rather the mitigating factors relating to the probation
150
violation.”
No explanation is given for this conclusion. It may be that
the court is interpreting the requirement to examine “mitigating factors”
as consideration of “mitigating circumstances,” required by the Criminal
151
Rules of Procedure.
However, even if this is assumed, it is unclear
why the court focuses only on the factors relating to the probation
violation and excludes any consideration of the facts surrounding the
underlying offense.
It is arguable that the court’s holding is justified because the
underlying offense has already been considered in the decision to
152
designate an offender as EJJ.
However, the same is true in adult
cases. The underlying offense is an integral part of the original
153
If the sentence is stayed, the underlying offense is again
sentence.
considered in adult revocation proceedings under the provisions of
154
Minnesota’s Sentencing Guidelines.
Because revocation of the EJJ designation results in a transfer of the
case to adult court, it is logical to apply the adult standards to the
decision to revoke the stayed adult sentence. Furthermore, the standards
set forth in the Sentencing Guidelines are consistent with the intent of the
EJJ statute. The Guidelines caution that the decision to revoke is a
serious one and “should not be a reflexive action to technical violations
155
of the condition of the stay.”
The Guidelines also urge trial courts to
use “great restraint” in execution of a prison sentence for offenders
originally convicted of “low severity offenses” or offenders who have
156
“short prior criminal histories.”
The court’s reasoning in B.Y. is
consistent with this portion of the Sentencing Guidelines. However, the
150. Id. at 769-70.
151. See MINN. R. CRIM. P. 27.04, subd. 2(1)(d).
152. The severity of the offense is one of the six public safety factors the court is
required to consider under MINN. STAT. § 260B.130, subd. 2 (2002).
153. SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 116 (showing the severity of the offense as
one of the two factors considered in sentencing).
154. Id. § III.B. (2003) (urging less judicial forbearance for violations by those
“convicted of a more severe offense”); see, e.g., State v. Hamilton, 646 N.W.2d 915, 918
(Minn. Ct. App. 2002) (considering the severity of the offense during a revocation
hearing for probation violations).
155. SENTENCING GUIDELINES § III.B, supra note 116.
156. Id.
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reasoning in B.Y. ignores the next statement within the Guidelines: “Less
judicial forbearance is urged for persons violating conditions of a stayed
sentence who were convicted of a more severe offense or who had a
157
longer criminal history.”
The effect these provisions of the
Sentencing Guidelines have on EJJ revocation proceedings is a question
that remains unanswered by this opinion.
After confining consideration of mitigating factors to circumstances
relating to the probation violation, the B.Y. court explains the mitigating
factors it found in the record. These factors include: B.Y.’s amenability
to treatment in a probationary setting as demonstrated by his successful
completion of a juvenile residential program, the term of probation
violated not being a condition set by the court or perhaps not clearly
understood by B.Y., and, in light of all the circumstances, the failure to
158
show that B.Y. could not be counted on to avoid antisocial activity.
While giving guidance on what factors should be considered as part
of the EJJ revocation decision, the court’s analysis is troubling in a
number of ways. First, the court appears to put itself in the position of
fact finder rather than a reviewing court. Second, the opinion disregards
the lower court’s consideration of interim sanctions imposed by the
probation officer prior to commencement of the violation proceedings.
The opinion states of B.Y.’s violation of the curfew established by
the probation officer that “[a]lthough appellant was warned by the
probation officer of the curfew, it is probable that appellant did not fully
comprehend the harsh sanction he would face for violating curfew.
Similarly, it is more probable that such a violation is not evidence that
159
appellant is likely to return to criminality.”
The court makes no
reference to the record to support these conclusions. Furthermore, the
lower-court record does not appear to support these conclusions. Thus,
this portion of the opinion indicates a willingness of the B.Y. court to step
160
outside its role as a reviewing court and to sit as a fact finder.
Equally troubling is the court’s apparent disregard of the trial
157. Id.
158. B.Y., 659 N.W.2d at 769-72.
159. Id. at 770.
160. See In re M.D.O., 462 N.W.2d 370, 374-75 (Minn. 1990) (discussing the
purpose of appellate review to determine whether a trial court made an error and not to
try the case de novo). Standards of review exist to ensure “uniformity and consistency by
prohibiting the retrial of a case on appeal.” Id. at 374. “Trial courts stand in a superior
position to appellate courts in assessing the credibility of witnesses.” Id. at 374-75. See
also State v. Kates, 616 N.W.2d 296, 300 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000) (remanding a case after
noting that a certain factual determination would exceed the role and ability of an
appellate court).

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2003

25

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 2 [2003], Art. 3
3 SANTELMANN - PAGINATED.DOC

452

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

12/8/2003 2:50 PM

[Vol. 30:2

court’s consideration of intermediate sanctions imposed by the probation
officer prior to commencement of the violation proceedings. Although
the probation violation listed B.Y.’s failure to abide by his curfew as the
sole grounds for revocation, the attached probable cause statement
161
chronicled other behaviors.
The probable cause statement alleged that
B.Y. had failed to maintain regular contact with his probation officer,
attend school, reside at home, abide by the curfew set by his probation
officer, and had been found in a home where gang members were
162
present.
At the violation hearing, the probation officer informed the
court that, as a result of these behaviors, B.Y. had been placed on a more
intense level of supervision, told to perform community work service
hours (which, according to the probation officer, he had failed to
163
complete), and placed in detention for forty-eight hours.
The
probation officer also informed the court that the same evening B.Y. was
released from detention following his forty-eight-hour placement, he
164
violated his curfew.
The trial court’s Memorandum of Law accompanying the
165
revocation order reflects consideration of these intermediate sanctions.
Absent the acknowledgement that B.Y. “apparently did not comply” with
166
the requirement that he keep in touch with his probation officer, the
B.Y. court does mention the other factors considered by the trial court
when it concluded that the adult sentence was executed “as a result of a
167
curfew violation.”
Thus, it appears the B.Y. court failed to consider
the record used by the trial court in deciding to revoke B.Y.’s EJJ
designation and execute his adult sentence.
Disregard of the factors considered by the trial court appears
inconsistent with the standard of review previously applied to both
juvenile and adult revocation proceedings. In applying the Austin
analysis to the record of the proceedings, the B.Y. court does not afford
the trial court broad discretion. Nor does the court articulate the trial
court’s abuse of its broad discretion. Perhaps one of the most important
messages lower courts can take from B.Y. is the importance of making a
161. See Appellant’s Brief and App., supra note 67, at App. 2-3 (citing Order and
Memorandum). The original Order and Memorandum is not accessible to the public due
to B.Y.’s juvenile status at the time of the offense.
162. See id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 2-4.
165. See id.
166. B.Y., 659 N.W.2d at 771.
167. Id.
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complete record of all reasons justifying the trial court’s decision.
V. CONCLUSION
Because it is a case of first impression, the B.Y. decision makes an
important contribution to the growing body of law governing EJJ
proceedings. By holding that the three-step Austin analysis used in adult
cases also applies to EJJ revocation proceedings, the court provides an
analytical structure for lower courts to use in EJJ revocation proceedings.
More guidance is needed as to whether the analysis applies to the
decision to revoke EJJ designation or only to the decision to revoke the
stay of execution of sentence upon transfer to adult court. Application of
the first two Austin factors is consistent with both the spirit and intent of
the EJJ statute. Application of the third Austin factor to the decision to
revoke the stay of execution of sentence appears consistent with the
policies applied in adult proceedings; however, it appears inconsistent
with the intent of the statute to provide certainty of punishment. In
addition, the way in which the B.Y. court applies the Austin analysis to
the facts of the case calls into question previously well-established
principles of law. It is now unclear what standard of review will be used,
and to what extent a probation officer’s authority can be enforced, in EJJ
revocation cases. The decision leaves as many questions unanswered as
it answers, and thus ensures further litigation and debate on how best to
implement Minnesota’s Extended Jurisdiction Juvenile statute.
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